Varieties of Second Modernity and the Cosmopolitan Vision by Beck, Ulrich
Theory, Culture & Society
2016, Vol. 33(7–8) 257–270











This text was prepared for presentation in Nagoya, Japan, in 2010. Its aim was to
explore a dialogue with Asians toward a cosmopolitan sociology. Beginning from the
idea of entangled modernities which threaten their own foundations, Ulrich Beck
advocated a complete conceptual innovation of sociology in order to better com-
prehend the fundamental fragility and mutability of societal dynamics shaped by the
globalization of capital and risks today. More specifically, he proposed a cosmopolitan
turn of sociology: first, by criticizing methodological nationalism; second, by introdu-
cing the concept of cosmopolitization; third, by re-mapping social inequalities; fourth,
by discussing risk society in the context of East Asian development; and fifth and
finally, by proposing a cosmopolitan vision. Along this line, Beck attempted an over-
view of the researches done on second modern transformation in East Asia
and suggested that an active dialogue may be possible when Asians begin to see
the West from their perspectives rather than being caught in the Euro-centric and
West-hegemonic presuppositions.
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In his inspiring programmatic statement ‘Meeting the Challenges of
Global Sociology: From Gothenburg to Yokohama’, the new President
of the International Sociological Association (ISA), Michael Burawoy
(2010), remains ambiguous as to whether global sociology is just an
additional perspective, a supplement to the conventional nation-state
centered sociology. Or is it more than that: a substitute for the main-
stream, that is to say, a critical turn in sociological theory and research?
The first line of argument I call ‘global sociology’, the second one ‘cosmo-
politan sociology’. The Global Dialogue (Beck, 2010) on those alternative
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visions to me seems to be most important for ‘sociology on the move’ in
the coming years.
The collapse of a world order is the moment for reflection on the domin-
ant social theory and research, but surprisingly this is not the case today.
Mainstream social theory still floats loftily above the lowlands of epochal
transformations (climate change, financial crisis, nation-states) in a
condition of universalistic superiority and instinctive certainty. This
universalistic social theory, whether structuralist, interactionist, Marxist,
critical or systems-theory, is now both out of date and provincial. Out of
date because it excludes a priori what can be observed empirically: a fun-
damental transformation of society and politics within modernity (from
first to second modernity); provincial because it mistakenly absolutizes the
trajectory, the historical experience and future expectation ofWestern, i.e.
predominantly European or North American, modernization and thereby
also fails to see its own particularity.
This is why we need not only a ‘global sociology’ as the coordination
of national sociological organizations (as Burawoy has in mind), but a
cosmopolitan turn in social and political theory and research. How can
social and political theory be opened up, theoretically, empirically, as
well as methodologically and normatively, to historically new, entangled
modernities which threaten their own foundations (Beck, 1999, 2009)?
How can it account for the fundamental fragility and mutability of soci-
etal dynamics (of unintended side-effects, domination and power),
shaped, as they are, by the globalization of capital and risks at the begin-
ning of the 21st century? What theoretical and methodological problems
arise and how can they be addressed in empirical research? Today I want
to discuss these questions in five steps:
First, I will call into question one of the most powerful convictions
about society and politics, one which binds both social actors and social
scientists: methodological nationalism. Methodological nationalism
equates modern society with society organized in territorially limited
nation-states (Beck and Grande, 2010a). Second, I propose to draw an
essential distinction between cosmopolitanism in a normative philosoph-
ical sense and cosmopolitization as a social scientific research programme.
Third, I am going to illustrate this paradigm shift by re-mapping social
inequalities; fourth, by discussing risk society and its East Asian varieties.
Fifth and finally, I will pick up the question: What does a ‘cosmopolitan
vision’ imply for the social sciences and humanities at the beginning of
the 21st century?
1. Critique of Methodological Nationalism
In my book Risk Society (1992) I argue that there is an epochal shift
from industrial to risk societies. The former were based upon industry
and social class, upon welfare states and upon the distribution of various
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goods organized and distributed through the state, especially of good
health, extensive education, and equitable forms of social welfare.
There were state-organized societies, there was a national community
of fate, and there were large-scale political movements, especially based
upon industrial class divisions that fought over the distribution of their
various ‘goods’. In the post-war period in Western Europe there was a
welfare state settlement in such industrial societies based upon achieving
a fairer distribution of such goods.
By contrast the concept of risk society is based on the importance of
bads. Risk societies involve the distribution of bads that flow within and
across various territories and are not confined within the borders of a
single society. Nuclear radiation is a key example of this, but also finan-
cial risks, global warming, SARS, etc. These risks cannot be confined
into any scientific space or into any current sector of time. Such risks thus
cannot be insured against. They are uncontrolled and the consequences
incalculable. This argument about the ‘borderlessness’ of the risk society
has, together with the writings of many others, developed the analysis of
‘globalization’ implications for sociology. I have especially shown the
nature and limitation of methodological nationalism. What does this
mean and what is wrong with it?
In brief: methodological nationalism assumes that the nation, state
and society are the ‘natural’ social and political forms of the modern
world. Where social actors subscribe to this belief I talk of a ‘national
outlook’; where it determines the perspective of the social scientific obser-
ver, I talk of ‘methodological nationalism’. The distinction between the
perspective of the social actor and that of the social scientist is crucial,
because there is only a historical connection between the two, not a
logical one. This historical connection – between social actors and
social scientists – alone gives rise to the axiomatics of methodological
nationalism. Methodological nationalism is neither a superficial problem
nor a minor error (Beck and Grande, 2010a). It involves both the rou-
tines of data collection and production as well as the basic concepts of
modern sociology and political science, concepts such as society, social
class, state, family, democracy, international relations, etc.
Moreover, sociologists tended to generalize from ‘their’ particular
society to a claim about how ‘society’ in general is organized (this
holds also for my book Risk Society [1992]). American sociology, in
particular, developed in this way, presuming that all societies were
more or less like that of the USA, just poorer! It was perfectly possible
to study that particular society and then to generalize as though all, or at
least most, other societies (at least those that mattered!) were much the
same. This led to debates about the general nature of order or of conflict
within ‘society’ based upon the distinct US pattern. Order and conflict
theories were to be ‘tested’ within the USA and it was presumed that
these conclusions could then be generalized to all societies, or at least to
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all rich industrial societies. For decades it was simply how sociology
worked; it was a taken-for-granted way of doing sociology – then
‘global studies’ marched in.
2. How to Research the Global: We Do not Live in an Age
of Cosmopolitanism but in an Age of Cosmopolitization
We can distinguish three phases in the way the word ‘globalization’ has
been used in the social sciences: first, denial; second, conceptual refine-
ment and empirical research; third, ‘cosmopolitization’. The initial denial
is over because the theoretical and empirical refinement revealed a new
social landscape in the making (see Held and McGrew, The Global
Transformations Reader, 2003). Its dominant features include intercon-
nectedness, which means dependency and interdependency of people
across the globe. Virtually the entire span of human experiences and
practices is in one way or another influenced by the overwhelming inter-
connectivity of the world. (This should not be confused with world
system and dependency theories.)
The third phase uncovers the core unseen, unwanted consequence of
this global interconnectivity: really existing cosmopolitization – the end
of the ‘global other’. The global other is here in our midst. This is pre-
cisely the point: to clearly distinguish between philosophical cosmopolit-
anism and social scientific cosmopolitization.
Cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant’s philosophical sense means
something active, a task, a conscious and voluntary choice, clearly the
affair of an elite, a top-down issue. But today in reality a ‘banal’, ‘coercive’
and ‘impure’ cosmopolitization unfolds unwanted, unseen – powerful and
confrontational beneath the surface or behind the façade of persisting
national spaces, jurisdictions and labels. It extends from the top of the
society down to everyday life in families, work situations and individual
biographies – even as national flags continue to be raised and even if
national attitudes, identities and consciousness are strongly being reaf-
firmed. Banal cosmopolitization is, for example, seen in the huge array
of foodstuffs and cuisines routinely available in most towns and cities
across the world. It is possible with enough money to ‘eat the world’.
What others have viewed as a ‘postmodern eclecticism’ I see not against
the modern but as rather a new reflexivity about what modernity is. Thus,
cuisines, global risk, art and global cultural conflicts (for example, about
the Danish Mohammed cartoons) are assembled, compared, juxtaposed,
and reassembled out of diverse components from multiple countries
around the world. So the new volcanic landscapes of ‘societies’ and their
radicalized social inequalities have to be re-mapped on the macro level
as well as on the micro level, and projected horizontally through commu-
nication, interaction, work, economy and, indeed, all such social and
political practices.
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Like climate change, most of the main impetuses for social and eco-
nomic transformations in the new century, as Chang Kyung-Sup (2010)
argues, do not differentially or exclusively apply to certain limited groups
of nations. Consider the following: global free trade and financialization,
corporate deterritorialization and transnationalized production, globa-
lized labor use, competition and class conflicts, globalized policy consult-
ing and formulation (coerced by the IMF, etc.), internet communication
and cyberspace, globally orchestrated bioscientific manipulation of life
forms (gradually including human bodies), global risks of all kinds
(financial crisis, terrorism, AIDS, swine flu, SARS), transnational demo-
graphic realignments (migration of labor, spouses, children), cosmopoli-
tanized arts and entertainments and, last but not least, globally financed
and managed regional wars. There are no permanent systematic hierar-
chies, sequences or selectivities by which different groups of nations –
whether at different levels of development, in different regions or of dif-
ferent ethnicities and religions – are exposed to these new civilizational
forces in mutually exclusive ways. Wanted or not, they are every nation’s
and every person’s concern because they are structurally enmeshed with
the new civilization process which I call ‘(reflexive) cosmopolitization’;
and the civilizational condition thereby shared across the globe is ‘(reflex-
ive or) second modernity’ (Chang, 2010: 444–5).
The recent world history seems to dictate that surviving, let alone
benefiting from, these new civilizational forces requires every nation to
actively internalize them and one another. The sociological implication
is: the other is in our midst! Isolationist efforts – whether spoken of in
terms of trade protectionism, religious fundamentalism, national funda-
mentalism, media and internet control or whatever else – are readily sub-
jected to international moral condemnations (and are, to some extent,
ineffective). In fact, accepting or refusing these forces remains beyond
willful political or social choices because they are globally reflexive –
that is, compulsively occurring through the ‘cosmopolitan imperative:
cooperate or fail!’
It has become a commonplace that national institutions alone are
unable to cope with the challenges of regulating global capitalism and
responding to new global risks (Beck, 1999, 2009). It is no less obvious
that there is no global state or international organization capable of
regulating global capital and risk in a way comparable to the role
played by the European welfare national state in first modernity.
Instead, we can observe a complex reconstitution of political authority,
with which to organize the mechanisms of global economic regulation,
risk management and control in ways characterized by new forms of
political interdependence (Grande and Pauly, 2005). At present, the pol-
itics of the ‘world risk society’ is an extraordinarily intricate terrain,
composed, among other things, of co-ordinated national mechanisms,
bilateral and multilateral agreements, inter-, trans- and supranational
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institutions, transnational corporations, private charity foundations, and
civil society groups.
Despite this rapidly growing number of global organizations and trans-
national institutions, there is an increasing unease, nourished not least by
the hesitant responses to the global financial crisis, the European currency
crisis, and the poor results of the last global climate conference at
Copenhagen, that these institutions are proving unable to address the
challenges they were created to meet. Similar developments can be
observed at the national level regarding, for example, democratic institu-
tions, welfare systems, families, etc. Can the World Bank solve the global
problem of poverty? Can the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) solve a global food crisis? Can the World Trade
Organization effectively regulate global trade? It seems as if these institu-
tions do not constitute a sufficient basis for managing or controlling the
global risks and crises created by the global victory of industrial
capitalism.
This is exactly what the transformative dynamics of the second,
cosmopolitan modernity is about! Isn’t there a gulf of centuries between
the threats, opportunities and conflict dynamics of border-transcending,
radicalized modernization in the 21st century and the ideas, institutions
and structures of industrial capitalism and national state authority
rooted in the 19th century (Held and McGrew, 2003)?
3. Re-mapping Social Inequality beyond Methodological
Nationalism
Although we still study social inequality – and indeed, across the globe,
inequalities seem to have increased – it is less clear that social class is the
principal unit of analysis and investigation. I rather provocatively devel-
oped the argument that individualization is the social structure of the
second modernity, and this produces non-linear, open-ended, and
ambivalent consequences. This is again a very different vision from
most sociology focused around the ‘zombie concepts’ of the first mod-
ernity, especially the idea that social class based on occupational division
is the key element within social structures and that the object of class
struggle is to transform the state.
I have developed four points here: First, poverty is no longer a char-
acteristic of those within the working class. It is something that many
people will now experience, especially including young middle-class
people undergoing higher education. Second, the world of a second mod-
ernity is a world of unbelievable contradictions and contrasts where
super-modern castles or citadels are constructed next to scenes of
Apocalypse Now (as with the now destroyed World Trade Center in
New York, with thousands of beggars living in the subway below).
Class hardly captures such shimmering inequality. Third, the major
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movements of change have little to do with class, even that responsible
for the most stunning transformation of the past three decades, such as
the financial crisis of 2008, ‘9/11’ and the dramatic and unpredicted
bringing down of the Soviet empire by various rights-based social net-
works. Fourth, the national outlook on social inequality is inward orien-
tated. It stops at the borders of the nation-state. Social inequalities may
blossom and flourish on the other side of the national garden fence – that
is, at best, cause for moral outrage, but politically irrelevant.
A clear distinction must be made, therefore, between the reality of
social inequality and the political problem of social inequality. National
boundaries draw a sharp distinction between politically relevant and
irrelevant inequality. Inequalities within national societies are enormously
magnified in perception; at the same time inequalities between national
societies are faded out. The ‘legitimation’ of global inequalities is based
on an institutionalized ‘looking the other way’. The national gaze is
‘freed’ from looking at the misery of the world. It operates by way of
a double exclusion: It excludes the excluded. And the social science of
inequality, which equates inequality with nation-state inequality, is unre-
flectively party to that. It is indeed astonishing how firmly global inequal-
ities are ‘legitimated’ on the basis of tacit agreement between nation-state
government and nation-state sociology – a sociology programmed to
work on a nation-state basis and claiming to be value-free!
My point is: The performance principle legitimates national inequality,
the nation-state principle legitimates global inequality (in another form).
How? The inequalities between countries, regions and states are
accounted politically incomparable. In a perspective bounded by
nation-state, politically relevant comparisons can only be played out
within the nation-state, never between states. Such comparisons, which
make inequality politically explosive, assume national norms of equality.
That is why even massive differences in income between persons with the
same qualifications but different nationality only then have a political
force if they can be related to a horizon of perception of common equal-
ity. Such a common frame only emerges when the persons belong to the
same nation or the European union of states or are employed in the same
company, even if in different national subsidiaries.
Yet that is precisely what the national gaze fades out: The more norms
of equality spread worldwide, the more global inequality is stripped of
the legitimation basis of institutionalized looking away (Beck, 2009). The
wealthy democracies carry the banner of human rights to the furthest
corners of the earth, without noticing that the national border defences,
with which they want to repel the streams of migrants, thereby lose their
legitimation. Many migrants take seriously the proclaimed human right
of equality of mobility and encounter countries and states which – not
least under the impact of increasing internal inequalities – want the norm
of equality to stop short at their fortified borders. Put in other words that
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means: The conception of social inequality, based on principles of
nationality and statehood, misleads analysis. Most theorists of class,
including Bourdieu, who thought so extensively about globalization in
his final years, identify class society with the nation-state. The same is
true of Wallerstein, Goldthorpe, in fact also of almost all non-class
theory sociologists of inequality (and incidentally also of my individual-
ization thesis).
4. Risk Society and its East Asian Varieties
Why is the concept of ‘(world) risk society’ so important in order to under-
stand the social and political dynamics and transformations at the begin-
ning of the 21st century? It is the accumulation of risks – ecological,
financial, military, terrorist, biochemical and informational – that has
an overwhelming presence in our world today (Beck, 1999; Beck and
Grande, 2010b). To the extent that risk is experienced as omnipresent,
there are only three possible reactions: denial, apathy and transformation.
The first is largely inscribed in modern culture but ignores the political risk
of denial; the second gives way to a nihilistic strain in postmodernism; the
third marks the issue the theory on global risk society raises: How does the
anticipation of a multiplicity of man-made futures and its risky conse-
quences affect and transform the perceptions, living conditions and insti-
tutions of modern societies?
In order to answer this question we first have to distinguish between
risk and catastrophe. Risk does not mean catastrophe. Risk means
the anticipation of catastrophe. Risks are about staging the future in
the present, whereas the future of future catastrophes is in principle
unknown. Without techniques of visualization, without symbolic
forms, without mass media, without art, risks are nothing at all. The
sociological point is: If destruction and disaster are anticipated this
might produce a compulsion to act. The social construction of a ‘real’
anticipation of future catastrophes in the present (like climate change, or
financial crisis) can become a political force, which transforms the world
(for the better or the worse).
In a second step we then have to distinguish between three types of
future uncertainties: threats, risks and manufactured uncertainties. The
risk society thesis always encounters the objection: Have not endanger-
ment and insecurity belonged to human existence from its beginnings, in
earlier ages seemingly more so then today (sickness, short life expectan-
cies, wars, and epidemics)? This is true, but according to a conventionally
agreed distinction, this is not ‘risk’ but a ‘threat’. Again we have to make
the following distinction: ‘risk’ is a modern concept, risk presupposes
human decisions, humanly made futures (probability, technology, mod-
ernization). This first modern concept of risk has to be distinguished
from ‘manufactured uncertainties’ (second modernity).
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Typically today, communication and conflict flare up around this par-
ticular typeofnewmanufactured risk (Beck, 2009).Neither natural disasters
– threats – coming from the outside and thus attributable to God or nature,
such as prevailed in the pre-modern period, have this effect any longer (they
do in religious cultures).Nor do the specific calculable uncertainties – risks –
that are determinable with actuarial precision in terms of a probability cal-
culus backed up by insurance and monetary compensation, such as were
typical offirstmodern industrial society, fall in this category.At the centreof
risk societies are ‘manufactureduncertainties’. Theyare distinguishedby the
fact that they are dependent on human decisions, created by society itself,
immanent to society and thus not externalizable, collectively imposed and
thus individually unavoidable; their perceptions break with the past, break
with experienced risks and institutionalized routines.
Threat, risk and manufactured uncertainty can be differentiated in
ideal-typical terms as outlined here, but in reality they intersect and com-
mingle. In fact, the problems of drawing hard and fast distinctions
between these politically very differently valued aspects of future uncer-
tainty comprise a decisive focus and motor of risk conflicts.
These are some elements of the European model of world risk society.
How has this model to be modified examining various types of risks
associated with East Asian ‘compressed modernity’? The Korean soci-
ologists Sang-Jin Han and Young-Hee Shim (2010) even conclude that
‘the concept of risk society is more relevant to East Asia than to Western
societies’ – but it has to be redefined. They distinguish two modes of risk
production in contemporary societies. On the one hand, ‘new global
risks’ produced by a radicalization of the first, industrial modernity,
have been emerging. These so-called ‘manufactured uncertainties’ are
the dominant type of risk in Western, in particular West European,
societies. Examples are climate change, transnational terrorism and sys-
temic economic risks. However, Han and Shim argue that ‘it is wrong to
conceptualize all risks along this way. On the other hand, certain types of
risk are produced as consequences of the deficiencies built into the rush-
to strategy of development in East Asia’ (Han and Shim, 2010: 471).
Examples of these ‘deficiency risks’ are large-scale accidents of various
kinds, violence, contamination of foods and tap water, fraudulent con-
struction projects, earth breaks which destroy cities, dislocation of the
family and so on.
Han and Shim also distinguish two different modes of risk dispersion:
transnational and regional: ‘Risks may be called ‘‘transnational’’ if they
can, in principle, happen everywhere in the world. In contrast, risks may
be ‘‘regional’’ if they tend to occur not everywhere but in those specific
countries that merge into a particular pathway to modernity’ (Han and
Shim, 2010: 471).
The ‘deficiency risks’ produced by the rush-to strategy of moderniza-
tion in East Asia are mostly regional in scope. They affect East Asian
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countries in a specific way, although they materialize in a global context.
As a result, risk society in East Asian countries takes a completely dif-
ferent shape than in Western Europe. It is constituted by different risks,
different risk cultures and different risk conflicts. Han and Shim conclude
that by examining ‘world risk society’, we need to focus also on the
concrete reality of East Asia. This is not because the Western view of
global risks lacks validity, but because other types of risks, which origin-
ate from deficiencies of rush-to modernization, call for attention that is
no less urgent in East Asia (Han and Shim, 2010).
I want to pick up this line of argument very shortly, illustrating how in
second modernity and its process of individualization the decision to
marry and have children in order to experience family life as a ‘haven
in the heartless, capitalistic world’ turns into an incalculable risk. How
does individualization crystallize in East Asia, especially in Japan? Which
indicators do speak for individualization, which against it? (What I have
to say is only a product of ‘second hand sociology’ which urgently needs
to be corrected by those who are experts on the subject.) From the late
1990s Japanese women have utilized their increase in personal freedom in
seemingly undermining social reproduction, a domain which has been
conceived and deployed almost exclusively as a private concern by the
state as well as its citizens. Since social reproduction has remained in the
private realm without significant public support or intervention, women’s
personal decisions did have a quiet but critical impact. This is a crucial
indicator for individualization: the significant decrease in population
(and, as you know, South Korea and Japan are close to world cham-
pionship in this domain).
There are additional connected indicators of individualization: By
deferring, forgoing or ending marriage, refusing to produce more than
one or two offspring (or to procreate at all) or by courageously rejecting
family ties beyond the nuclear unit, Japanese women have taken their
society by surprise. All of a sudden, these tacit yet highly effective trends
have begun to be widely recognized by policy officials and academics
alike as a demographic risk to the social sustainability of the national
economy, and that of the nation itself.
There is an important distinction to be made between ‘individualiza-
tion’ as a structural process and ‘individualism’ as a normative ideology
or philosophy. Is there a phenomenon which could be called ‘individual-
ization without individualism’, as Chang and Song (2010) argue? Or to say
it differently: an ‘individualization with familialism’ (Shim and Han,
2010)? With this I mean that the facts of individualization are combined
with the rhetoric of family values.
In first modernity the nuclear family was – as Talcott Parsons argues
in his functionalistic model of the modern national society – a key unit of
the social reproduction of the nation-state. What are the functions of
family life in second modernity in Japan (and other East Asian countries
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or Europe)? My suggestion is that families are not confronted with fewer
functions and burdens but that they have become functionally overloaded
and socially risk-ridden (see Chang and Song, 2010). Especially the func-
tion of social security has been ‘externalized’ from Japanese corporations
to Japanese families. But to interpret this as a ‘turn back to family’ would
be mistaken, since the structural process of individualization has not
been disrupted. The more women succeed in (higher) education and in
taking over positions in the labour market, the more patriarchal hier-
archy in family and society is becoming dysfunctional and being ques-
tioned. Actually, from a sociological point of view, there is a paradox of
re-familialization and de-familialization (reducing the effective scope of
family life and relations) at the same time. One of the implications of this
contradictory trend is (as I said before) that the decision to marry and
have children becomes an incalculable risk!
5. A ‘Cosmopolitan Vision’ for the Social Sciences
What are the more general theoretical implications of such exemplary de-
construction and re-construction? The first insight is that the progression
from pre-modernity to the first modernity and second modernity is not
universal and cannot be generalized. On the contrary, this progression is
a central feature of the particular European path to modernity. The false
universalism implicit in sociological theories cannot be uncovered by
looking at Europe from a European standpoint. It can only be ‘seen’
by looking at Europe from a non-European perspective, that is with
‘Asian eyes’ – in other words, by practising methodological cosmopolit-
anism! Methodological cosmopolitanism not only includes the other’s
experiences of and perspectives on modernization but corrects and rede-
fines the self-understanding of European modernity.
It is a paradox that the very lively debates on cosmopolitanism and
cosmopolitization are – as Craig Calhoun argues:
overwhelmingly Euro-American. They are about globalization, and
about risks, rights, and responsibilities in an interconnected world,
but they reflect disproportionately views from the old ‘core’ of the
modern world system (and Western-educated elites from formerly
colonial outposts). This is the source of at least four biases.
First, though an effort is made to include consideration of poor,
developing, or emerging economies, cosmopolitan theories reflect
the perspective of the rich. Second, though an effort is made to be
multicultural, cosmopolitan theories are rooted in the West. Third,
the way in which most cosmopolitan theories try to escape cultural
bias is by imaging an escape from culture into a realm of the uni-
versal (as though those who travel aren’t still shaped by their
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previous cultural contexts and as though there the global circuits
themselves don’t provide new cultural contexts). Fourth, despite
attention to social problems, because cosmopolitan theories are
rooted in the (declining) core of the modern world system, they
tend to imagine the world as more systematically and uniformly
interconnected than it is. (Calhoun, 2010: 597–8)
Those biases are exactly what cosmopolitan sociology has to overcome.
Let me end by summarizing in seven theses that the cosmopolitan turn
entails:
1. An earlier phase of modernity was organized primarily in terms of nation-
states, which sought to manage many of the risks people faced, although
markets and other phenomena did cross state boundaries.
2. Modern social and political theory grew with the dominance of nation-states
and internalized the nation-state as the tacit model for the ideal-as-society –
influenced by the actual power of nation-states but also by the widespread
aspiration to organize the world on the basis of nation-states.
3. An earlier philosophical cosmopolitanism developed in this context, calling
on people ethically to transcend narrow nationalist views, as though the
sociological conditions of their lives did not really matter.
4. Consider global free trade and financialization, corporate deterritorialization
and transnationalized production, globalized labour use, internet communi-
cation, globally orchestrated bioscientific manipulation of life forms and, last
but not least, globally financed and managed regional wars. Recent world
history seems to dictate that surviving, let alone benefiting from, these new
civilizational forces requires every nation to actively internalize them and one
another. This is what I call ‘(reflexive) cosmopolitization’, and the civiliza-
tional condition shared across the globe is called ‘reflexive’ or ‘second’
modernity.
5. I do not see the nation-state as disappearing. I see it as only one of many
actors in a global power game. The focus needs to be on that global power
game and not on the nation-state.
6. Such a shift in focus requires the restructuring of the social sciences not
only conceptually, theoretically, and methodologically but also in the very
organization of research. All their fundamental concepts – especially the
nation-state – need to be re-examined. Many are ‘zombie concepts’ that con-
tinue to live on even though the world that they related to at one time no
longer exists.
7. Cosmopolitan sociology not only involves a fundamental reorganization of
the social sciences, and a dramatic shift in focus – from methodological
nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism – but it must also be critical
in its orientation. One critical focus must be on the increasing inequality in
the world. The focus on the nation-state has led to a shameful subordination
of ‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ sociology to the imperatives of the nation-state
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which blinds even empirical sociology to the fundamental transnational trans-
formations of domination and inequality.
There are risks as well as opportunities in the cosmopolitan turn, but for
now let us kiss the frog and then find out if the frog turns into a prince –
one that begins to re-map the landscapes, flows, new lines of conflict,
actors and institutions of the cosmopolitan age. After all, kissing doesn’t
hurt anybody, does it?1
Notes
This text is from Ulrich Beck’s public lecture during the Annual Meeting of the
Japanese Sociological Society at Nagoya University, Japan, on 6 November
2010. This publication of the English translation of that lecture is by kind
permission of Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim.
1. For this debate on cosmopolitan sociology and for all quotations see Beck
and Grande (2010a, 2010b).
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